讲座题目：The Proportional Solution in a Permit Sharing Problem
王运通，加拿大温莎大学经济系教授，博士毕业于南开大学和加拿大蒙特利尔大学，主要从事网络成本分担问题、不确定信息下水资源效率分配和环境经济的污染许可分担等方面的研究工作，主持加拿大社科人文研究项目2项，在Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Environmental and Resource Economics, European Journal of Operational Research等主流重要期刊发表论文70余篇，专著3部，并为Journal of Mathematical Economics, Environmental and Resource Economics, European Journal of Operational Research多个期刊的编委审稿人。.
Abstract: A permit sharing problem is represented by countries, each of whom owns a technology that emits pollutants such as GHGs to produce output and privately owns a certain amount of permits. The permits are treated as the only input and are regarded as perfectly transferable among the countries, unlike regular factor inputs such as labor or capital. First, we axiomatically characterize a series of solutions called the proportional solutions. We hypothetically separate countries into two groups, permit contributors and technology contributors, and identify solutions under which countries receive rewards systematically according to the two types of contribution they provide (Separation Principle). Two other main axioms (NART and NARP), saying that no group of countries benefit from rearranging their contributions of technologies or permits among themselves, are used in characterizing the proportional solutions. Second, we introduce another axiom called Voluntary Participation to the solutions of sharing the surplus produced beyond the autarky economy output. This addition of Voluntary Participation leads to an interesting result; the surplus must be shared equally between the two groups, the permit (input) contributors and technology contributors. Hence the equal share proportional solution is uniquely characterized.